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Several philosophers of biology have argued for the claim that the generalizations
of biology are historical and contingent.1–5 This claim divides into the following
sub-claims, each of which I will contest: first, biological generalizations are restricted to a
particular space-time region. I argue that biological generalizations are universal with
respect to space and time. Secondly, biological generalizations are restricted to specific
kinds of entities, i.e. these generalizations do not quantify over an unrestricted domain.
I will challenge this second claim by providing an interpretation of biological general-
izations that do quantify over an unrestricted domain of objects. Thirdly, biological
generalizations are contingent in the sense that their truth depends on special (physically
contingent) initial and background conditions. I will argue that the contingent character
of biological generalizations does not diminish their explanatory power nor is it the case
that this sort of contingency is exclusively characteristic of biological generalizations.
1. Introduction: The Universality of Laws
Many philosophers of biology are convinced that there are important differences between
(fundamental) physics and the biological sciences. One salient way in which biology is unlike
physics – these philosophers claim – concerns the features of generalizations that play an
epistemic role in the scientific practice of these disciplines. It is a majority view in philosophy
of biology that (fundamental) physics states universal and exceptionless laws, while the
biological sciences rely on non-universal and physically contingent generalizations1–7 This
majority view in the philosophy of biology converges with the results of the literature on
ceteris paribus laws since the mid-1990s: generalizations in the so-called ‘special sciences’
(such as neuroscience, psychology, sociology, economics, and the life sciences, and so on)
have different features than the laws of (fundamental) physics (cf. Ref. 8 for a survey).9
In this paper, I will agree with these philosophers that the dynamical laws in fundamental
physics and the laws in the special sciences differ in the way they describe.10 However,
despite the differences between laws in fundamental physics and generalizations in the special
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sciences (including biology), most philosophers believe that, in physics as well as in the
special sciences, laws are important because they are statements used to explain and to predict
phenomena, they provide knowledge how to successfully manipulate the systems they
describe, and they support counterfactuals. Statements that are apt to play these roles
in the sciences I call lawish. Similarly, Mitchell11,12 characterizes generalizations in the bio-
logical sciences (and in the special sciences in general) as ‘pragmatic laws’ in virtue of
performing at least one these roles.
One might begin to wonder: what exactly is the target of philosophers of biology who stress
differences between the features of generalizations in fundamental physics and in the biological
sciences? Philosophers of biology are worried that logical-empiricist views have created certain
philosophical prejudices about how we think about laws of nature (e.g. Refs 1 and 5). In the
early debate on laws of nature, empiricist philosophers of science believed that lawlikeness was
the crucial concept in order to find out which statements are law statements and which are
not. Most importantly for our purposes, lawlikeness is commonly associated with universality
(Ref. 13, p. 301). Philosophers of biology argue that the logical-empiricist view is a philo-
sophical prejudice that ought to be overcome because it has been developed by focusing
exclusively on physics while ignoring the biological sciences and other special sciences. It is
simply false to believe that the generalizations of the latter scientific disciplines are universal.
By contrast to lawlikeness, I use ‘lawish’ in the following way: a general statement is
lawish if it is of explanatory and predictive use, successfully guides manipulation, and
supports counterfactuals. Contrary to the traditional understanding of laws, being lawish
does neither require universality nor other characteristic features of fundamental physical
laws (such as the feature of satisfying symmetry principles). It is a matter of convention
whether one would still want to use the term ‘law’ for non-universal (i.e. not lawlike)
general statements.14 In other words, whether one wishes to refer to lawish statements by
the honorific term ‘law’ is merely a verbal issue and not an interesting philosophical
problem. One can either use a new term for lawish, non-universal explanatory, general
statements. For instance, Woodward and Hitchcock15 introduce the concept of an expla-
natory generalization. Or, as I maintain in this paper, one can insist that if a statement plays
a lawish role then it shares sufficiently many properties with universal laws in order to be
called a law. Christopher Hitchcock and James Woodward admit that their account may be
read as a reconceptualization of lawhood (cf. Ref. 15, p. 3). In order to avoid a fruitless
quarrel about verbal issues, my strategy in this paper will be to address two questions.
1. Are the laws of biology non-universal – and, if so, in which sense?
2. If the generalizations of biology are indeed in some sense non-universal,
does this fact question their ability to play a lawish role?
Before I go on to answer these questions, let me provide a few examples of candidates for
lawish generalizations in biology. The following five generalizations are classic examples
in the debate on whether there are any laws of biology.
> Mendel’s Law of Segregation. ‘In a parent, the alleles for each character
separate in the production of gametes, so that only one is transmitted to each
individual in the next generation’ (Ref. 16, p. 36).
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> Hardy-Weinberg-law. ‘In an infinite, randomly mating population, and in
the absence of mutation, immigration, emigration, and natural selection, gene
frequencies and the distribution of genotypes remain constant from
generation to generation’ (Ref. 16, p. 36, cf. Ref. 1, p. 221).
> The Krebs-cycle-generalization. ‘In aerobic organisms, carbohydrate meta-
bolism proceeds via a series of chemical reactions, including the eight steps
of the Krebs cycle.’ (Ref. 1, p. 219)
> Bergmann’s rule. ‘Given a species of warm-blooded vertebrates, those races
of the species that live in cooler climates tend to be larger than those races of
the species living in a warmer climates’ (Ref. 1, p. 224).
> Allen’s rule. ‘Given a species of warm-blooded vertebrates, those races of the
species that live in cooler climates have shorter protruding body parts like
bills, tails, and ears than those races of the species that live in warmer
climates’ (Ref. 1, p. 224).
Recently, the debate has been enriched by a large number of interesting examples of
lawish generalizations (cf. especially Refs 17–21). It is important to present a few
of these example in order to prove the point that the above-listed classic examples of
lawish generalizations are not an exceptional (and sometimes even outdated, no longer
accepted) part of scientific practice in biology. Quite to the contrary, biology seems be
full of lawish generalizations (which, admittedly, do not live up to the standard of
lawlikeness).
The area law. ‘The equilibrium number S of a species of a given taxonomic group on an
island (as far as creatures are concerned) increases [polynomially]22 with the island’s
area [A]: S5 cAz. The (positive-valued) constants c and z are specific to the taxonomic
group and island group’ (Ref. 17, pp. 235f)
The classic Lotka-Volterra Model. ‘The classical Lotka-Volterraprey–predator model’s
equations are the following. Prey’s growth equation is
dN 1=dt ¼ rN1  bN1N2
Predator’s growth equation is
dN 2=dt ¼ ebN1N2  cN2
In the equations, r is the intrinsic growth rate of prey (in the absence of predation), c is
the intrinsic death rate of predator (in the absence of their prey), b is the predation rate
coefficient, e is predation efficiency, N1 is the population size of prey at time t, and N2 is the
population size of predators at time t. These equations describe the dynamics in which
populations of both prey and predators exhibit periodic oscillations’ (Ref. 20, p. 222).
The Volterrarule. ‘Any biotic or abiotic factor that both increases the death rate of
predators and decreases the growth rate of their prey has the effect of decreasing the
predator population size, whereas the population size of its prey increases’ (Ref. 20,
p. 228).
Kleiber’s rule. ‘Basal metabolism, an estimate of the energy required by an individual
for the basic processes of living, varies as aW0.75, where W is its body size [and a is a
constant – A.R.]’ (Ref. 20, p. 219).
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The exponential population growth model. ‘Population growth is density independent,
and it can be described by the equation
N t ¼ N0e
rt
where Nt is the population size at time t, N0 is the initial size of the population, and r is
the growth rate of the population, called the intrinsic rate of increase’ (Ref. 20, p. 212).
Mechanistic models. In the recent literature, the focus is on a large class of generalizations
describing the steps in a mechanism such as the mechanism of photosynthesis, the LTP
mechanism (Ref. 4).
Generalizations like these are believed to be lawish, although they are not universal
generalizations.
So, why is it important to understand lawishness? One weighty reason stems from the
conceptual connection of laws to causation and explanation. As mentioned above,
according to the empiricist interpretation the most important feature of lawlikeness is
universality. The idea to understand lawhood mainly in terms of universality has led
many theories of causation and explanation to rely on universal laws. This assumption
turns out to be problematic: the central challenge for any theory of non-universal laws in
the biological sciences is to account for their apparent lawish function (in the sense
introduced above). If we are not able to provide an explication of non-universal laws,
then (at least) the philosophy of biology faces a severe problem concerning causation and
explanation in its domains. Many theories of causation and explanation in their standard
form presuppose universal laws of nature (cf. Ref. 23, p. 99 for a detailed discussion). If
we do not want to give up the immensely plausible opinion that the biological sciences
refer to causes and provide explanations (Assumption 1) for purely philosophical reasons,
then we are in need of a theory of non-universal lawish generalizations.
In this paper, I will proceed as follows: in Section 2, I will provide several alternative
meanings of the ambiguous concept of universality. I suggest that the claims made by
philosophers of biology about the non-universality of lawish statements ought to be
distinguished into three claims: first, the lawish statements are restricted to a space-time
region. Second, the lawish statements are restricted to specific kinds of entities. Third, the
lawish statements are true only if special physically contingent initial and background
conditions obtain. In Section 3, I argue against the claims that lawish generalizations are
historical in sense that they are restricted to a specific spatio-temporal region and specific
kinds of entities. In Section 4, I question the view that the feature of contingency
undermines the lawish character of a statement. I argue for this claim by showing that the
feature of contingency is compatible with four standard accounts of laws in the special
sciences (i.e. completer, normality and statistical, invariance, and dispositionalist theories).
In Section 5, I summarize the results of the preceding sections. I conclude with an outlook
on future research concerning the features of laws describing biological complex systems.
2. What is Universality?
As stated in the introduction, many philosophers of biology believe that the lawish
generalizations of biology are – unlike the laws of fundamental physics – not universal.
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But what does it mean to be universal, and, respectively, to be non-universal? It is an
astonishing fact that this question is seldom answered in a systematic way (Refs 12,
23–25 are notable exceptions). The lack of a systematic approach is a serious problem,
because universality is an ambiguous concept. In accord with Andreas Hüttemann
(Ref. 25, pp. 139–141), we may distinguish four dimensions of universality with respect
to a law statement.
(1) First Dimension – Universality of space and time. Laws are universal1 iff
they hold for all space-time regions.
(2) Second Dimension – Universality of Domain of Application. Laws are
universal2 iff they hold for all (kinds of) objects.
(3) Third Dimension – Universality for External Circumstances. Laws are
universal3 iff they hold under all external circumstances, i.e. circumstances
that are not referred to by the law statement itself. One useful way to
interpret Hüttemann’s reference to external conditions is to say that laws are
true for all initial and background conditions of the system whose
behaviour is described by the law.
(4) Fourth Dimension – Universality with respect to the Values of Variables.
Laws are universal4 iff they hold for all possible values of the variables
26
in the law statement. Universality in this sense acknowledges that laws
usually are quantitative statements (and, thus, the predicates contained in
these statements are to be conceived as variables ranging over a set of
possible values).
Paradigm examples of fundamental physical laws (such as Newton’s laws, Einstein’s
field equations, and the Schrödinger equation) are usually taken to be universal in all four
dimensions (cf. Ref 24, section 6.1; Ref. 25, pp. 139–141).
The crucial question in this paper is which dimension of universality is at stake
when philosophers of biology claim that the lawish generalizations of their discipline
are non-universal. Philosophers of biology seem to refer to several dimension of
(non-)universality. Hence, we need to disambiguate their claims. I think it is a fair
reconstruction to say that three claims with respect to three dimensions of universality
prevail in the literature.
1. Historicity claim I. The lawish generalizations of biology are historical
because they are spatio-temporally restricted (Ref. 3, pp. 755–758). That is,
the generalizations are non-universal1.
2. Historicity claim II. The lawish generalizations of biology are historical
because they are restricted to certain kinds of objects that exist in a limited
space-time region (Ref. 3, pp. 755–758). In other words, the generalizations
do not have the feature of being universal2.
3. Contingency claim. The lawish generalizations of biology are true only if
(a) certain physically contingent initial and background conditions C obtain;
and (b) these conditions C lead to the evolution of those biological entities
that biological generalizations in question describe (Ref. 1, pp. 218f).
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I interpret Beatty’s influential evolutionary contingency claim as a special
case of non-universality3: lawish generalizations in biology are true only if
specific initial and background conditions obtain.
In Section 3, I will argue that we can easily reject Historicity claim I and Historicity
claim II. Hence, the lawish generalizations of biology can indeed be regarded as
universal1 and universal2. In Section 4, I will agree with most philosophers of biology
that the lawish generalizations are true only if certain physically contingent initial and
background conditions obtain. However, I will argue that this kind of contingency does
not prevent generalizations from playing a lawish role.
3. Against the Alleged Historical Character of Biological Generalizations
Are the lawish generalizations of biology universal1 and universal2? I think the answer is yes.
Being universal1 and universal2 are features that the lawish generalizations of biology and the
laws of physics have in common. My answer is in conflict with Rosenberg’s historicity
claims I and II (see Section 2). Contrary to Rosenberg, I will argue for two claims: first,
lawish generalizations in the biological sciences hold for all space-time regions (i.e. they
are universal1). This kind of universality allows that these generalizations simply lack an
application in some space-time regions. Secondly, lawish statements can be formalized such
that they quantify over an unrestricted domain of objects (if so, they are universal2).
Arguing for these claims might not seem plausible at first glance, because generalizations
in the biological sciences are usually interpreted as system laws (Cf. Ref. 27, Essay 6, for
the similar notion of a phenomenological law.) Gerhard Schurz (Ref. 24, Section 6.1)
introduces the notion of a system of laws as follows: while fundamental physical laws ‘are
not restricted to any special kinds of systems (be it by an explicit antecedent condition or
an implicit application constraint)’ (Ref. 24, p. 367), system laws refer to particular systems
of a certain (biological, psychological, social, etc) kind K in a specific space-time region.
Hence, so the usual characterization continues, lawish statements in the special sciences
typically have an in-built historical dimension, which the fundamental physical laws lack,
because they are restricted to a limited space-time region where the objects of a certain
kind K exist (for instance, cf. Refs 1 and 3). I will argue that Schurz is absolutely correct in
characterizing lawish statements in the biological sciences as being ‘restricted to [y]
special kinds of systems (be it by an explicit antecedent condition or an implicit application
constraint)’ (Ref. 24, p. 367). However, if one adopts Schurz’s characterization of
generalizations in biology as system laws, then one is still entitled to believe that these
statements are universal1 and universal2. Let me explain why I think Schurz’s interpretation
of biological generalizations as system laws differs from Rosenberg’s spatio-temporally
restricted laws. I will argue for this claim in two steps: first I will argue for the universality1
of lawish statements, then for their universality2.
Argument for Universality1
Does Schurz’s characterization of system laws imply that the generalizations of biology
are non-universal1? No. Simply because a generalization G does not have an application
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in some space-time region s, it does not mean that the law does not hold at s. In order to
be truly non-universal1, G would have to conform to a thought experiment of ‘Smith’s
Garden’ by Tooley:
All the fruit in Smith’s garden at any time are apples. When one attempts to take an
orange into the garden, it turns into an elephant. Bananas so treated become apples as
they cross the boundary, while pears are resisted by a force that cannot be overcome.
Cherry trees planted in the garden bear apples, or they bear nothing at all. If all these
things were true, there would be a very strong case for its being a law that all the fruit in
Smith’s garden are apples. And this case would be in no way undermined if it were found
that no other gardens, however similar to Smith’s garden in all other respects, exhibited
behaviour of the sort just described. (Ref. 28, p. 686, emphasis added)
According to Tooley, a law L can be spatio-temporally restricted to a space-time region s
(as the laws in Smith’s garden) in the sense that L fails to be true in a situation that is
perfectly similar to the situation in s, except for the fact that this perfectly similar
situation is located in a different space-time region s* (cf. Ref. 29).
I think the generalizations of biology that are truly non-universal1 would be similar to
the laws that are true of various fruit in Smith’s garden. But it seems to be a far too strong
claim that laws in the biological generalizations are local in the same way as are the laws
in Smith’s garden. It seems to be a more promising option to say that (a) biological
generalizations are universal1, and (b) these generalizations simply lack application in
some space-time regions. For instance, Bergmann’s rule, the classic Lotka-Volterra
Model and Mendel’s law of segregation do not hold on Mars, because there are neither
warm-blooded vertebrates, nor anything standing in a predator-prey relation, nor cells
with alleles. However, this situation does not indicate that Bermann’s rule, the classic
Lotka-Volterra Model and Mendel’s law of segregation are local laws – as are the laws of
Smith’s garden. A better understanding seems to be that these statements happen to have
no application on Mars (e.g. if there are no warm-blooded vertebrates on Mars, then the
conditions of application for Bergmann’s rule are not satisfied; cf. Ref. 30, Section 3). To
illustrate my claim in another way, consider the following scenario: suppose we were to
find a space-time region s that is in biological aspects perfectly isomorphic to Earth
(including certain physically contingent initial and background conditions) – that is, the
only difference between life on Earth and life in this region s is the spatio-temporal
location. And suppose further we were to discover that none of the generalizations of
current terrestrial biology is true in region s. Would we not demand an explanation for
this local inapplicability? It is precisely this demand for an explanation that reveals the
intuition that Bergmann’s rule is quite dissimilar to the laws of Smith’s garden.
Argument for Universality2
Does the characterization of lawish statements in the biological sciences as system laws
imply that these statements are non-universal2? No, it does not. At first glance, biological
generalizations, if viewed as system laws, appear to be non-universal2: special science
laws quantify over a restricted domain of objects of a certain kind – not over a domain of
objects of all kinds. For instance, consider Bergmann’s rule once more: ‘given a species
of warm-blooded vertebrates, those races of the species that live in cooler climates tend
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to be larger than those races of the species living in a warmer climates’ (Ref. 1, p. 224).
Bergmann’s rule seems to be restricted to warm-blooded vertebrates – it does not make
any claim about electrons, atoms, neurons, rational agents, markets, etc. One might get
the idea that generalizations of biology refer to a restricted domain D that is a proper
subset of the domain X of all things. Bergmann’s rule can be formalized as quantifying
over a restricted domain D of warm-blooded vertebrates (with d as an individual variable
of domain D):
8(d) ((lives in cooler climates)d- (tends to be larger than those races of the species
living in a warmer climates)d.
But is this really a convincing reconstruction of lawish statements in the special sciences?
I can provide an alternative formalization that quantifies over the domain of all objects.
This formalization interprets the kind of object (here: warm-blooded vertebrates) as a
predicate and not as a restriction of the domain. In the alternative formalization, x is an
individual variable for the unrestricted domain X:
8(x)(is a member of a species of warm-blooded vertebrates)x4(lives in cooler
climates)x- (tends to be larger than those races of the species living in a warmer
climates)x.
The alternative, unrestricted formalization of Bergmann’s rule is a way to save
universality2. By formalizing lawish generalizations in this way, I provide a reason to
reconstruct them as generalizations quantifying over all kinds of objects.31
This is not a trivial result at all, because philosophers of biology, such as Beatty1
and Rosenberg,3 insist that generalizations in the biological sciences should be regarded
as (a) being historical in the sense of applying only to a specific space-time region
(this is in contradiction with universality1), and (b) as referring to a restricted domain
of objects (this contradicts universality2). Contrary to these philosophers, I want to
emphasize that one can maintain that lawish generalizations in the biological sciences are
universal1 and universal2. In other words, the lawish generalizations do not differ from
the fundamental laws of physics with respect to the first and the second dimension of
universality.
4. The Case for Non-universal3 Generalizations
In Section 2, I interpret Beatty’s evolutionary contingency thesis as a special case of
non-universality3: lawish generalizations such as Allen’s rule, the Volterra rule, and the
exponential growth model hold only if very specific initial and background conditions
obtain. Allen’s rule, the Volterra rule, and the exponential growth model do not hold
under all (physically) possible initial and background condition. This is why I interpret
these lawish generalizations as being non-universal3. There is good evidence for the view
that the biological sciences are not an exceptional case in postulating contingent laws.
Physically contingent lawish generalizations are of importance in the physical sciences as
well. Let me provide a famous example from the physical sciences: the second law of
thermodynamics (for short, the Second Law). The Second Law is a non-fundamental
physical law. The Second Law is usually taken to play a role in physical explanation,
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prediction, and manipulation – i.e. it performs a lawish role. The standard formulation of
the Second Law is:
The total entropy of the world (or of any isolated subsystem of the world), in the course
of any possible transformation, either keeps at the same value or goes up. (Ref. 32, p. 32)
Craig Callender provides an example as an illustration of the Second Law:
Place an iron bar over a flame for half an hour. Place another one in a freezer for the same
duration. Remove them and place them against one another. Within a short time the hot
one will ‘lose its heat’ to the cold one. The new combined two-bar system will settle to a
new equilibrium, one intermediate between the cold and hot bar’s original temperatures.
Eventually the bars will together settle to roughly room temperature. (Ref. 33)
It is majority opinion that an explanation of why the second law obtains has to require
more than just the fundamental laws of physics. According to a tradition originating
in the work of Ludwig Boltzmann, one has to rely on physically contingent initial
conditions – among other things – in order to explain why macroscopic physical systems
conform to the Second Law. An influential proposal for such an initial condition is the
so-called past hypothesis, i.e. the claim that the initial macro state of the universe (or an
isolated subsystem thereof) was a state of low entropy (Ref. 32, p. 96; Ref. 34,
pp. 298–304; Ref. 35, pp. 156–158). The upshot of the Boltzmannian explanation of the
Second Law is as follows: the Second Law is a lawish statement which is true only if
special initial conditions (expressed by the past hypothesis) obtain – and these special
initial conditions are a physically contingent fact with respect to the fundamental
dynamical laws of physics. (Cf. Refs 53 and 54 for further examples of physically
contingent lawish statements.)
The question I would like to answer in this section is the following: if the
generalizations of biology are indeed non-universal3, does this fact undermine their
ability to play a lawish role? I will provide arguments for the following answer: no, a
generalization might be non-universal3 and lawish at once. I will argue for this claim by
showing that several standard theories of lawish statements (or ceteris paribus laws) are
consistent with the fact that the truths of some lawish statements depend on whether
special initial and background conditions obtain (cf. Ref. 8 for a survey of these and
other accounts of ceteris paribus laws).
(i) Completer Accounts
The basic idea of completer approaches consists of regarding lawish generalizations in
the biological sciences – such as Bergmann’s rule, the area law, the Volterra rule, and so
on – to be incomplete as they stand. Adding missing conditions to the antecedent of the
law statement completes the generalizations. The guiding thought is that the completed
antecedent implies the consequent of the lawish statement. Jerry Fodor motivates the
completer account of laws in the special sciences (including the biology) as follows:
Exceptions to the generalizations of a special science are typically inexplicable from the
point of view of (that is, in the vocabulary of) that science. That’s one of the things that
makes it a special science. But, of course, it may nevertheless be perfectly possible to
explain the exceptions in the vocabulary of some other science. [y]. On the one hand
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the [special sciences’] ceteris paribus clauses are ineliminable from the point of view of
its propriety conceptual resources. But, on the other hand, we have – so far at least – no
reason to doubt that they can be discharged in the vocabulary of some lower-level
science (neurology, say, of biochemistry; at worst physics). (Ref. 36, p. 6)
Fodor’s idea is that the additional, completing factors whose existence is required by the
ceteris paribus clause cannot be entirely specified within the conceptual resources of, for
instance, biology. However, the completion can (at least in principle) be achieved within
the vocabulary of some fundamental science such as neurophysiology or physics.
A physical microdescription of the antecedent condition A is called a realizer of A (the
same A may have several different realizers). Fodor defines a completer more precisely:
A factor C is a completer relative to a realizer R of A and a consequent predicate B if:
(i) R and C is strictly sufficient for B
(ii) R on its own is not strictly sufficient for B
(iii) C on its own is not strictly sufficient for B. (cf. Ref. 37, p. 23)
Based on this notion of a completer, Fodor defines the truth conditions of a cp-law as
follows:
‘cp(A-B)’ is true if for every realizer R of A there is a completer C such that (A4C)-B.
[Cf. Refs 23, 38 and 39 for variants of the completer account.]
The crucial question for my purposes is whether the completer approach is compatible
with lawish generalizations that have the feature of being non-universal3. The answer is
yes, I believe. The natural place for listing the specific physically contingent initial and
background conditions – that Beatty (1995) emphasizes – is the completer condition C.
For instance, in the case of Allen’s rule the completer consists of certain physically
contingent initial and background conditions without which a species of warm-blooded
vertebrates that live in cool climates would not have evolved. It is a controversial matter
whether adding the evolutionary history to the antecedent of the lawish generalization is
strictly sufficient for the truth of the consequent of the law statement (cf. Refs 18 and 40
versus Ref. 21).41 However, what matters most for the problem that this paper is
concerned with is that there is nothing in the completer account itself preventing lawish
generalizations from being dependent on specific initial and background conditions.
(ii) Normality and Statistical Accounts
The main idea of normality theories consists of advocating the following truth conditions
for laws in the biological sciences: Allen’s rule is a true lawish generalization if it is
normally the case that given a species of warm-blooded vertebrates, those races of the
species of warm-blooded vertebrates that live in cooler climates have shorter protruding
body parts, such as bills, tails, and ears, than those races of the species that live in warmer
climates (cf. Ref. 8, Section 8). Schurz (Refs 42; 24, Section 5) analyses lawish state-
ments in biological sciences as normic laws of the form ‘As are normally Bs’. Schurz
explicates normality in terms of a high probability of the consequent predicate, given
the antecedent predicate, where the underlying conditional probabilities are objective
statistical probabilities. According to the statistical consequence thesis, normic laws
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imply numerically unspecified statistical generalizations of the form ‘Most As are in fact
Bs’, by which they can be empirically tested.
So, is it compatible with the normality account that the truth of lawish statements of
biology depends on specific physically contingent initial and background conditions?
Here the answer is also positive: normality statements can have a complex antecedent
which lists further conditions. In analogy with the completer approach, these conditions
might include those physically contingent conditions without which – in the case of
Allen’s rule – warm-blooded vertebrates would not have evolved in a cool climate.
An analogue strategy can be applied to the statistical approach to lawish generalizations
proposed by Ref. 43. Their view is closely related to Schurz’s normic account. According
to Earman and Roberts, a typical special science generalization ‘asserts a certain
precisely defined statistical relation among well-defined variables’ (Ref. 43, p. 467).
That is, special science laws are statistical generalizations of the following form:
‘in population H, a variable P is positively statistically correlated with variable S across
all sub-populations that are homogeneous with respect to the variables V1, y,Vn’
(Ref. 43, p. 467). The obvious place to mention the physically contingent conditions
without which, for instance, warm-blooded vertebrates would not have evolved in a cool
climate are the variables V1, y,Vn. It is worth pointing out a genuine feature of normic
and statistical accounts: unlike in the case of completer accounts, it is not the case that a
proponent of the statistical and the normic account claims that the antecedent of the
lawish statement is sufficient for the consequent.
Moreover, and most likely in agreement with Beatty and Rosenberg, Schurz42 defends
the statistical consequence thesis by appealing to an evolution theoretic argument.44
Schurz argues that evolutionary systems are self-regulatory systems whose self-regulatory
properties have been gradually selected according to their contribution to reproductive
success. He claims that the temporal persistence of self-regulatory systems is governed by
a certain range of ‘prototypical norm states’, in which these systems constantly have
to stay in order to keep alive. According to Schurz, regulatory mechanisms compensate
for disturbing influences coming from the environment. Although the self-regulatory
capacities of evolutionary systems are the product of a long adaptation history, they are
not perfect. Some organisms may be dysfunctional and their normic behaviour may have
various exceptions. However, Schurz claims, it has to be the case that these systems are in
their prototypical norm states in the high statistical majority of cases and times. For
otherwise, these systems would not have survived in evolution.
The upshot of this discussion is that the normality account is not merely compatible
with non-universality3. In fact, one of its main proponents, Gerhard Schurz, even provides
an evolution-theoretic argument in favour of the account. If Schurz’s argument is sound,
then it implies that normic laws are a direct result of biological evolution.
(iii) Invariance Accounts
In accord with invariance theories, the distinctive feature of lawish generalization is
their invariance. Invariance is the feature that separates lawish and accidentally true
generalizations. A generalization is invariant if it holds for some, possibly limited, range
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of the possible values of variables figuring in the generalization. According to Woodward
and Hitchcock (Ref. 15, p. 17) and Woodward (Ref. 45, p. 250) a statement G is
minimally invariant if the testing intervention condition holds for G. The testing inter-
vention condition states for a generalization G of the form Y5 f (X):
(1) there are at least two different possible values of an endogenous variable X,
x1 and x2, for each of which Y realizes a different value (y1, y2) in the way
that the function f in G describes; and
(2) the fact that X takes x1 or, alternatively, x2 is the result of an intervention.
Take the Volterra rule as an example of an invariant generalization. According
to Woodward and Hitchcock’s account, the Volterra rule is minimally invariant if there is
an intervention (‘any biotic or abiotic factor’) such that the death rate of predators
(counterfactually) increases and the growth rate of their prey (counterfactually) decreases,
then the predator population size decreases and the population size of its prey increases.
So again, is the invariance account of lawish generalizations compatible with the
contingency claim? Yes, it is. Invariance is defined relative to a set of variables (such as
death rate of predators, population size, and so on) and a set of functions relating the
variables (such as an increase-decrease-function). An invariantist is free to embrace the
view that biological entities (e.g. rabbits and foxes) to which these variables apply have
evolved. And she is free to say that it is a physically contingent fact that biological
entities of this kind have evolved. The crucial point for the advocate of an invariance
account is this: given that certain entities of a kind K have evolved, the lawish
generalizations about members of K are the invariant generalizations.
(iv) Dispositionalist Accounts
According to the dispositionalist account, a law statement is true if the type of system in
question (i.e. those entities to which the law applies) has the disposition that the law
statement attributes to the system.46–48 For instance, the Krebs-cycle-generalization
states that aerobic organisms are the kind of system disposed to have a carbohydrate
metabolism proceeding via a series of chemical reactions, including the eight steps of the
Krebs cycle. The manifestation of this disposition might be disturbed, but aerobic
organism still have the disposition for Krebs-cycle-behaviour. That is, dispositionalists
reconstruct law statements as statements about dispositions, tendencies, and capacities,
etc, rather than about overt behaviour.49 The claim is that certain kinds of systems have
certain kinds of tendencies or dispositions.
Is it the case that the dispositionalist account is compatible with the claim that the
lawish generalizations of biology are non-universal3? We can provide a positive answer.
The dispositionalist can happily accept that the dispositions of biological systems have
evolved and, at the same time, she can maintain that lawish generalizations ought to be
interpreted as claims about the dispositions of evolved biological entities, such as aerobic
organisms (cf. Ref. 50, for further examples of biological dispositions).
What has been established in this section? I have started out by interpreting Beatty’s
evolutionary contingency claim as a special case of non-universality3. Then I have
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pointed out that biology is not the only sciences that relies on generalizations that depend
on physically contingent initial conditions (the Second Law is an example from physics).
The main result of this section is that four standard theories of lawish statements in the
special sciences (i.e. the completer account, the normality account, the invariance and the
dispositionalist account) are compatible with the feature of non-universality3. Thus, it
might be the case that the generalizations of biology differ from the fundamental physical
laws because the former are not true for all initial and background conditions (as Beatty
and Rosenberg argue). However, this result does not need to impress us since the gen-
eralizations of biology might still play a lawish role. This result requires a qualification:
these generalizations play a lawish role to the extent that discussed theories of special
science laws can be integrated into theories of explanation, prediction, and manipulation.
One can be optimistic about the prospects of a successful integration lawish statements
into theories of explanation because several recent theories of explanation do not require
universal laws and rely on non-universal generalizations instead.4,5,45,51
Before concluding this section, I will add a disclaimer: it is not the case that I have to
accept that every generalization that is true of evolved biological entities can play a
lawish role. In order to support this claim, I can rely on a distinction proposed by
Ken Waters.55 Waters distinguishes two classes of generalizations about evolved entities:
the first class of generalizations concerns the architecture of a biological entity, i.e. the
way it is built (such as ‘all major arteries have thick layers of elastic tissues around
them’, ‘all birds have wings’, ‘all zebras have stripes’, and so on). The second class
of generalizations describes how a biological entity changes over time. The lawish
role seems to be primarily ascribed to members of the second class – the dynamical
generalizations (or ‘causal’ generalizations, to use Waters’ terminology). Let me put is
more cautiously: it is at least not clear why I would have to accept that all architecture-
generalizations do in fact play a lawish role in scientific biological practice. The
epistemic role of architecture-generalizations might be limited to classifying systems of a
certain kind (which is the product of evolution and which might also be described by a
dynamical generalization).52
5. Conclusion
What has been achieved in the preceding sections? In Section 1, I reconstructed a view
held by many philosophers of biology: the generalizations occurring in the biological
sciences differ from the fundamental laws of physics, as the latter are typically taken to
be universal while the former are not. But what exactly does universality amount to? In
Section 2, I attempted to disambiguate ‘universal’ by suggesting several alternative
meanings of the concept of universality. Based on these alternative meanings I propose
understanding the claims made by philosophers of biology about the non-universality of
lawish statements in the following ways: first, the lawish statements are restricted to a
space-time region, i.e. the statements are non-universal1. Second, the lawish statements
are restricted to specific kinds of entities, i.e. the generalizations are non-universal2.
Third, the lawish statements are true only if very special physically contingent initial
and background conditions obtain. I take this kind of contingency to be a special case of
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non-universality3. In Section 3, I argued against the claims that lawish generalizations are
historical in the sense that they are restricted to a specific spatio-temporal region and to
specific kinds of entities. I opposed non-universality1 and non-universality2. The upshot
is that lawish generalizations and the laws of physics resemble one another because they
share the features of universality1 and universality2. In Section 4, I raised objections to
the view that the feature of contingency somehow undermines the lawish character of a
statement. I argue for this claim by showing that the feature of contingency is compatible
with four standard accounts of laws in the special sciences. This compatibility suggests that
a contingent generalization G of biology is lawish to the extent to which the presented
standard accounts of laws in special sciences permit that G is used for explanatory and
predictive purposes, that G guides manipulations, and supports counterfactuals etc. One
significant result of this discussion is that it does not matter at all whether one is willing to
call, for instance, Bergmann’s rule or the exponential growth model a law.
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